The puppet's paradox : an organic prosthesis by C. Cappelletto
1. This text was conceived during the time I spent at the Italian 
Academy for Advanced Studies in America at Columbia University, 
New York, thanks to the generous fellowship I received for the spring 
semester of the 2009–2010 academic year. 
2. For the discussion of the theatrical character of the puppet, in 
particular with respect to acting, see C. Cappelletto, Marionetta e arto 
fantasma: il perturbante di un corpo polimorfo, in Giocattoli, ed. A. 
Violi (Milano, 2010), pp. 107–139.
3. See in particular the photographs published in H. Bellmer, 
“Poupée: Variations sur le montage d’une mineure articulée,” 
Minotaure 6 (winter 1934–1935):30–31. See S. Taylor, “Hans Bellmer 
in the Art Institute of Chicago: The Wandering Libido and the Hysterical 
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All movables of wonder, from all parts, 
Are here: Albinos, painted Indians, Dwarfs, 
The horse of knowledge, and the learned pig, 
The stone-eater, the man that swallows fire, 
Giants, ventriloquists, the invisible girl, 
The bust that speaks and moves its goggling eyes, 
The wax-work, clock-work, all the marvelous craft 
Of modern Merlins, wild beasts, puppet-show, 
All out-o’-the-way, far-fetched, perverted things, 
All freaks of nature, all Promethean thoughts 
Of man; his dullness, madness, and their feats 
All jumbled up together, to compose 
A parliament of monsters.
—William Wordsworth, The Prelude (1850), 
book VII:706–718
The puppet is mostly understood as a figure of human 
passivity, which it expresses analogically through its 
inert and tame body.1 As the Oxford English Dictionary 
indicates, the figurative sense of “a small figure, human 
or animal” is indeed that of “a person [. . .] whose 
acts, while ostensibly his own, are suggested and 
controlled by another.” To man, inherently incapable 
of fully realizing his medial place, inasmuch as he is 
physically weak with respect to the animal kingdom and 
intellectually lacking with respect to godlike intelligence, 
the puppet offers not only the rhetorical force as a 
metaphor, but also the pathetic force as a performing 
object whose sphere of activity includes theater and 
playtime.2 These dual meanings can be found as early 
as this figure’s first appearance in the historical and 
philosophical records in Greek.
Regarding its theatrical character, at the end of the 
second century A.D., Athenaeus identifies the first known 
puppeteer [neurospaste] in Potheinos. Athenians had 
allowed him to perform his plays, and he is believed 
to have inspired Euripedes and his contemporaries 
(Deipn. I, 35, 19e). Xenophon in his Symposium, written 
around the year 385 B.C., corroborates puppet theater 
as a form of entertainment appreciated by the public: 
“[T]hey give me a livelihood by coming to view my 
puppets [neurospasta],” says the puppeteer in Symp. 
IV, 55. Later Plato in the Laws, composed around 360 
B.C., includes the “puppet show” [thaumata] among the 
performing arts in vogue at the time (Laws II:658b–c). 
In the middle of the first century B.C., Diodorus of Sicily 
speaks of Antiochus Cyzicenus, the drunk and inept 
sovereign of Syria born in 135 B.C., who, among the 
various occupations unworthy of a king, practiced the 
art of puppetry [thaumatopoioi], playing with silver- and 
gold-painted figures in the form of animals more than 
two meters tall (Library XXXIV/XXXV:34).
Similar negative assessments recur in Western culture 
at least up to the nineteenth century: The puppet will 
hardly be considered a serious pastime, fitting at most for 
children and traveling theater troupes intended for the 
young and simple-minded. It is not, however, the only 
form of entertainment of this sort. Dolls, mannequins, 
automatons, and—though only appearing much 
later—robots and androids collaborate in constituting 
the constellation of material and inorganic bodies—
anthropomorphic when they are not zoomorphic, and of 
generally reduced dimensions—that are maneuverable, 
in which the puppet participates. It is a vast constellation 
whose constituent members are outdated as toys and 
linked by the disconcerting characteristic of appearing 
like “mummified living beings” who invite us to 
acknowledge them as figures of ourselves. They are 
human beings of sorts, capable of provoking a primal 
uneasiness. The nature of their presence is in fact quite 
vivid, though ghostly at the same time. 
Hans Bellmer’s poupée in all of its variations offers 
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7. Aristotle, On the Cosmos, trans. D. J. Furley (London, 
Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass., 1955).
passed without a solution of continuity from the world of 
play to that of boredom.
Yet, if we take its aforementioned metaphorical 
valence into consideration, we can pinpoint the specific 
characteristic that renders the puppet both eccentric with 
respect to its traditional constellation of reference and so 
outdated that its artificial nature has been preserved from 
the aesthetic neutralization of the metamorphic principle 
active in living beings and their products, to which I 
just referred. The topical place in which the puppet is 
played as a metaphor for man is found at Laws I:644d–e, 
where Plato writes: “Let us suppose that each of us living 
creatures is an ingenious puppet [thauma] of the gods, 
whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some 
serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing; but this 
we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like 
sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to 
each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; 
and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and 
badness.”6 Plato uses the puppet as a schema of the 
future citizen whose nature he says needs to be molded 
and governed. Paradoxically, the passions themselves 
cause us to become, insofar as we are living creatures, 
“puppet-like.” The puppet is a reified expression of the 
passions that dominate man.
Plato’s passage becomes even more significant in 
relation to what Aristotle writes in On the Cosmos 
398b: God creates forms of every sort by means of mere 
movement, in a way analogous to that of an engineer 
who uses a single string to perform many operations and 
“in the same way too the men who run puppet-shows 
[neurospastai], by pulling a single string, make the 
creature’s neck move, and his hand and shoulder and 
eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according 
to a rhythmical pattern.”7 In passages with analogous 
content, such as On the Motion of Animals 7.701:b:1ff. 
and On the Generation of Animals II:1:734b:11 and 
II:5:741b:9, Aristotle defends a similar mechanistic 
position, even though referring to the automata, thus not 
only transposing the metaphorical sense of the puppet 
from the psychology to the physiology of movement, but 
also drawing an analogy between machine and nature, 
visual apotheosis of that quête of modern poetry whose 
protagonists are Baudelaire with his anti-humanism, 
Kleist’s marionette, Lautréamont and his “if it is a man 
or a stone or a tree,”4 and Matisse’s arabesques in which 
the human contour intermingles with the floral-patterned 
wallpaper of its surroundings. The list is long. Giorgio 
Agamben ends it as follows: “Whatever the name given 
to the object of its search, the quest of modern poetry 
points in the direction of that disturbing region where 
there are no longer either men or gods, where there is 
but a presence, rising incomprehensibly over itself like a 
primitive idol, at once sacred and miserable, enchanting 
and terrifying, a presence that possesses at once the 
fixed materiality of a dead body and the phantomatic 
elusiveness of a living one.”5
Today such a quest seems to have been both 
exacerbated and domesticated in current aesthetic 
and aesthesiological practices as well as in the mass 
production of the imaginary. On the one hand, man 
is setting into action a process of intense reification, 
enacting on his body itself the most varied strategies 
of manipulation—from plastic surgery to genetic 
engineering and bionic enhancement—that, causing 
the natural and the artificial to collapse into each 
other, obtain the paradoxical result of reinforcing 
our bond to our organic bodies. On the other hand, 
through the vast production of a certain type of toy, the 
metamorphic potential of this very process—in which 
body art represents nothing but its greatest moment of 
glory—is denied. Two examples are worth noting. The 
first comes from the Transformers series by Hasbro, 
whose “Robots in Disguise” line of toys for children can 
be manipulated in such a way as to create indifferently 
though obligatorily a vehicle, an instrument, an animal, 
or a robot, and whose “Pretender Beasts” line can 
camouflage its robot form with the help of animal-
shaped external shells. The second example is the film 
Toy Story 3 directed by Lee Unkrich and produced in 
2010 by Disney Pixar, in which the toys—that, handled 
by the children, become mere bodies at risk of being 
torn to pieces—seem incapable of having a long-term 
future other than being recycled, stored, or destroyed. 
We might then be led to think that even the puppet has 
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8. Roberto Cordeschi articulates five “theses that have marked the 
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Machines Before and Beyond Cybernetics (1998; Dordrecht, 2002). It 
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principle of correspondence between natural and artificial, which, in 
fact, seems to be related to that of Aristotle.
9. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford, 
1968), under neurospastos, on, to.
10. Ibid., under thauma, atos, to.
11. Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. A. Bloom (New York, 1991).
12. For a reading of this passage as Plato’s direct reference to 
shadow theater, see J. Przyluski, “Le Théâtre d’Ombres et la Caverne 
de Platon,” Byzantion: Revue Internationale des Études Byzantines 13 
(1938):595–603. See also A. Grocer, “The Puppet Theatre in Plato’s 
Parable of the Cave,” The Classical Journal LXXXXV, no. 2 (Dec. 
1999–Jan. 2000):119–129.
pulled by strings as elements worthy of wonderment and 
marvel. They use the expression thaumazo thaumata 
[I marvel at marvels] to describe the state of mind they 
evoke, then they use the verb thaumazo to indicate 
the wonder from which philosophy itself must have 
originated (respectively in Theaetetus 155d and in 
Metaphysics I:2:982:b:12). 
This circumstance offers the first suggestion that 
the puppet is capable of soliciting processes of 
comprehension—even if not of direct knowledge—that 
exceed its rhetorical and theatrical nature. It should 
not be surprising then to find it already in a seminal 
text for Western thought, the Platonic myth of the cave: 
“See a wall, built like the partitions puppet-handlers 
[thaumatopoioi ] set in front of [the] human beings and 
over which they show the puppets [thaumata]. Then 
also see along this wall human beings carrying all sorts 
of artifacts, which project above the wall, and statues 
of men and other animals wrought from stone, wood, 
and every kind of material; as it is to be expected, some 
of the carriers utter sounds while others are silent” 
(Republic VII:514b).11 The shadows of these objects, 
we know, are projected by a fire onto the wall of the 
cave that stands in front of a group of human beings 
who have been chained up at its entrance since they 
were children. These shadows constitute for them the 
only possible truth, along with their own shadows. Set 
these elements, Plato intervenes with an imperceptible 
move, though decisive for us: he adds that human 
bodies—in much the same way as puppets—do not 
present themselves to the enchained men as anything 
more than shadows, namely, as images.12 That way, 
we are led to neglect the understanding that if the 
puppet can signify someone whose movements are 
hetero-directed, it is because it is potentiality of 
movement—its movement is neither inhibited like a 
doll’s nor autokinetic like an automaton’s. Moreover, 
while anthropomorphic dolls bear the appearance of 
life and automatons simulate it, the puppet is a schema 
of action—not of posturing: It does not place itself in 
the order of “as if,” of imitation, of reproduction, of 
fiction. It does not copy man, who indeed provides no 
where the former reproduces the causal mechanisms of 
the latter, accentuating the involuntary character of the 
puppet’s kinetism.8 
Puppet’s wonderful strings
The puppet is meant by both philosophers as a 
pure line of movement. This purity hides important 
ambiguities, the first hints of which we find in the 
comparison between the two terminological families 
associated with this artifact: neurospastos and thauma. 
The former, neurospastos, indicates that which is “drawn 
by strings”9 and is composed of the words neuron—
“tendons”—and spastos in the family of the verb spao, 
which means “to draw,” but also “to wrench” and in a 
medical sense “to cause convulsion or spasm,” evocative 
of the syncopated nature of the puppet’s movement. 
Thauma means “wonder, marvel”10 and alludes to what 
generates marvel as well as to the sense of wonder that 
is generated but also, in the plural form, refers to the 
puppet-like world in such a strong way that in some 
cases performances with animals are also included in 
this terminological family, as Isocrates wrote in Antidosis 
213 in 353 B.C. Theophrastus in 319 B.C. extended 
this meaning to refer to the itinerant puppet theaters 
(Characters VI:4 and XXVII:7). Athenaeus will include 
mimes, acrobats and entertainers (Deipn. X:78:452f). 
It is evident that neurospastos very literally describes 
the passive kineticism exemplified by Aristotle, 
even though the tendons of animals were also used 
as strings (as, for example, in archery bows) and 
therefore as transmitters of energy thanks to their own 
specific elasticity. This definition would thus induce 
us to consider the puppet as an ingenious mechanism 
constructed as a replica of the human body, but it would 
leave unexplained the fact that both Plato in the Laws 
II:658b–c and Aristotle in the Metaphysics I:2:983a:14, 
in two very different contexts, think of these objects 
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[1950; Amsterdam, 2001], p. 142).
14. R. M. Rilke, Puppen, in Werke, ed. H. Nalewski et al. (1914; 
Frankfurt a. M., Leipzig, 1996–2003), vol. IV, pp. 685–692, here p. 
689.
15. G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh. The 
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York, 
1999), p. 3.
16. Ibid., p. 43.
17. G. Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. K. Attell 
(2002; Stanford, 2004), § 4, p. 16.
18. R. Descartes, Meditation II, in Meditations on the First 
Philosophy, ed. J. Cottingham (1639–1640; Cambridge, 1996), p. 17.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 21.
and a soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a natural (or 
animal) element and a supernatural or social or divine 
element, [w]e must learn [. . .] to think of man as what 
results from the incongruity of these two elements, and 
investigate not the metaphysical mystery of conjunction, 
but rather the practical and political mystery of 
separation.”17 
An ec-centric body
The tension between corporeal things and the 
intellect—or consciousness—was discussed in one 
of their most precise dramaturgies in the history of 
philosophy: the Second of Descartes’ Meditations on the 
First Philosophy, entitled The Nature of the Human Mind 
and How It Is Better Known than the Body. Descartes 
interrogates the ways in which it is possible to arrive 
at a true understanding of oneself and of one’s body, 
apart from the sense perceptions that induce beliefs that 
can be false. Having defined the body as an extension 
with a definite form whose presence is registered by 
the senses in a certain place and that is moved by other 
agents (“for, according to my judgment, the power of self 
movement, like the power of sensation or of thought, 
was quite foreign to the nature of a body”18), he pushes 
this position to an extreme by describing his own living 
body as a dead and abstract one (what phenomenology 
will call Körper): “I had a face, hands, arms and the 
whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen 
in a corpse, and which I called the body.”19 It is not by 
following a phenomenological attitude but according to 
rational judgment that he distinguishes man from thing: 
“If I look out of the window and see men crossing the 
square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say 
that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the 
wax. Yet do I see more than hats and coats which could 
conceal automatons?”20
The “fixed materiality of a dead body and the 
phantomatic elusiveness of a living one” I mentioned 
in relation to the constellation to which the puppet 
belongs, seem to find here the prelude to their 
theorization, and yet it is difficult to imagine two 
bodies more different from Descartes’ “mechanical 
structure” and Baudelaire’s squelette laboureur, more 
model at all.13 “The puppet is nothing if not fantasy. Dolls 
are entirely devoid of it and are precisely as inferior to a 
thing as puppets are superior.”14 
Through the story of the projection of shadows, the 
myth of the cave inaugurated a politics of knowledge 
that relies on the representation and selection of stable 
images and forms from the multiplicity of reality, 
abstracting from their corporeal materiality along an 
ascending path, until the reach of the luminous source of 
knowledge. The notion of something like an ambiguous 
artifact actualizing—not representing—the  controversial 
relation between “mind” and “body” is then neutralized 
and rejected out of any investigation into the realm of 
understanding. It is just a toy. Nowadays, the intellectual 
economy of Western thought based on discrimination—
and attempts at reconciliation—between data and 
ideas, is mostly considered to have run its course. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson give evidence of such 
a philosophical shift. They state in Philosophy in the 
Flesh, a book that is representative of a pressing line 
of thought today: “The mind is inherently embodied. 
Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are 
largely metaphorical,”15 so much so that “now that we 
know that there can be such a direct embodiment of 
reason, the question becomes an empirical one, to be 
settled in experimental neuroscience, not in the arena of 
philosophical argumentation.”16 The dichotomy between 
empirical and conceptual is, however, quite suspect. For 
it is indebted to the very tension between matter and 
thought that it would like to overturn and it places itself 
in a naturalistic-realist perspective of existence that is 
unable to justify its own foundation and that does not 
seem to be capable of rethinking this kind of distinction. 
It introduces an ingenuous realism, self-sufficiently 
expressed by its very animalism. Rather, as Agamben 
suggests, given that “in our culture, man has always been 
thought of as the articulation and conjunction of a body 
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21. G. Bachelard, Lautréamont, trans. R. S. Dupree (1940; Dallas, 
1986), p. 45. See the Italian edition of Bachelard’s text by F. Fimiani 
(Milano, 2009).
22. B. D’Argens, Thérèse philosophe ou Mémoires pour servir à 
l’histoire du P. Dirrag et de Mlle Eradice (1748; Paris, 1992), p. 28. It is 
worth mentioning that Boyer D’Argens’s novel was adapted for the 
stage at the Ateliers Berthier in Paris, directed by Anatoli Vassiliev, 
played by Valérie Dréville, Stanislas Nordey, and Ambre Kahan. The 
run lasted from April 5 until April 29, 2007. In order to capture the 
urgency of the passions, the actress Dréville remained immobile with 
the exception of a few syncopated movements. This is meant to express 
the relationship between the senses and the body treated as a puppet 
that has been discussed in The Paradox of Acting, in which Diderot, in 
order to save the actor from a disordered sensibility, invites him to 
make use of himself as though he were a “great basket-work figure of 
which he is the soul.” (D. Diderot, The Paradox of Acting, trans. W. H. 
in Histoire de Juliette will include in his catalogue of the 
libertine’s library—proposes indeed an image that also 
recalls the puppet-man passage in the Laws: “It certainly 
is mechanistic, my dear child: We have sensations, 
and form ideas—of physical good and evil as well as 
moral good and evil—only through our senses. As soon 
as we touch, hear, or see an object, spiritual particles 
flow into the small nerve cavities that alert the soul.”22 
disparate than the philosopher’s mannequin and the 
man who in the Lautréamont’s Les Chants de Maldoror 
exists “like basalt.” With Descartes the distinction 
lies between an aesthetic experience of life and the 
knowledge of truth, placing them as alternatives and 
proposing an economy of knowledge that distrusts the 
imagination and for which the dead body offers an 
element of stability, though in the negative. Baudelaire 
considers instead the diabolical figure of a living 
death, and Lautréamont the “muscular consciousness” 
associated with a certain “anatomical pride”—to put 
it in Bachelard’s terms.21 Precisely the diversity of their 
perspectives, however, gives relevance to the analogous 
character of the enterprise—to which I would add the 
materialistic Enlightenment. Boyer D’Argens in Thérèse 
philosophe—a novel long attributed to Diderot that Sade 
Figure 1. Aimee Mullins. Photograph by Nick Knight, 1998.
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Pollock [1777; London, 1883], p. 101). See also “A great actor [. . .] 
has no key peculiar to him; he takes the key and the tone fit for his part 
of the score, and he can take up any. [. . .] A great actor is also a most 
ingenious puppet, and his strings are held by the poet, who at each line 
indicates the true form he must take” (ibid., pp. 61–62).
23. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. 
Smith (1945; London, New York, 2002), pt. I, chap. 1, passim.
24. It is worth noting that one of the conditions that permitted Judt 
to live was the use of machines that today provide the means for the 
collapse of the living into the inorganic that I mentioned earlier.
25. T. Judt, “Night,” in The New York Review of Books, January 
14, 2010, p. 4, now recollected in T. Judt, The Memory Chalet (New 
York, 2010). Judt defines his existence as “cockroach-like” and 
human experiences and identifies each of them in 
specific forms. Finally, by focusing on a particular case, 
we are able to free ourselves from the assumption that 
the soul governs the body. As we shall see, if it did, the 
puppet would not exist. 
I shall therefore turn to an experience of the 
body antipodal to that proposed by Descartes and 
that, although not corresponding distinctly to any 
philosophical method, magisterially problematizes the 
presumed figure of passivity to which I have alluded 
thus far. The experience in question is detailed in 
“Night,” the first of a series of reflections that Tony Judt 
published in 2010. The British historian describes his 
life shaped by amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a pathology 
of the motor neurons that has resulted in a “progressive 
imprisonment without words,” although devoid of any 
“loss of sensation.”24 Judt is immobile but perfectly 
sentient: “By my present stage of decline, I am thus 
effectively quadriplegic. With extraordinary effort I can 
move my right hand a little and can adduct my left arm 
some six inches across my chest. My legs, although they 
will lock when upright long enough to allow a nurse 
to transfer me from one chair to another, cannot bear 
my weight and only one of them has any autonomous 
movement left in it. Thus when legs or arms are set in a 
given position, there they remain until someone moves 
them for me. The same is true of my torso, with the result 
that backache from inertia and pressure is a chronic 
irritation. Having no use of my arms, I cannot scratch an 
itch, adjust my spectacles, remove food particles from 
my teeth, or anything else that—as a moment’s reflection 
will confirm—we all do dozens of times a day. To say 
the least, I am utterly and completely dependent upon 
the kindness of strangers (and anyone else).” Judt refers 
to himself as “dead weight.” He seems to evoke the 
image of the Cartesian skeleton, the dichotomy of spatial 
extension and psychological interiority. Nevertheless, 
this “modern-day mummy,” as he also calls himself, 
who finds refuge in his thoughts in order to survive the 
night and “divert my mind from the body in which it is 
encased,” concludes the passage saying: “The pleasures 
of mental agility are much overstated, inevitably—as it 
now appears to me—by those not exclusively dependent 
upon them.”25 The immobile body is pressing in its 
While Boyer D’Argens can be said to go in a direction 
apparently antithetical to Descartes’ anesthesia, as well 
as to Plato’s ethics and to the performing imagination of 
the French poets, nevertheless all these works attempt to 
resolve the break between life and intelligence, between 
lived experience and control over the passions. What we 
have here are diverse endeavors to treat the articulation 
of flesh and spirit, all of which continue to presuppose 
the first to be passive and malleable, the second active 
and operative. 
Yet, attributing passivity to the body is merely a form 
of wishful thinking of which Descartes’ adamantine 
skeleton represents the extreme consequences. The 
body overcomes thought not because, as Lakoff would 
have it, thought is assimilated into it, but because, 
as paradoxical as it might seem, the body is not by 
any means sufficiently passive. It is not a matter of 
remembering that the Leib, my very own living body, 
is not reducible to the Körper, namely, my anatomy 
observed in the third person. The latter is the residue of 
the body as a res extensa that finds space in a continuum 
of things and is the product of philosophy’s gesture of 
abstraction. We have neither lived nor aesthetic-artistic 
experience of it. In order to find such an experience, we 
have to look into the polarity of the “habit-body” and 
the “body at this moment” that Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
proposes in Phenomenology of Perception. With the 
former he refers to the background of experience through 
which I have access to the world, with the latter to the 
body as modified by experience.23 The polarity of the 
two, aside from being suggestive of the temporality of 
proprioceptive experience, affords a conception of the 
res extensa as the result of a neutralization of our “body 
at this moment.”
Against any generalizing approach, Merleau-
Ponty investigates phantom limb syndrome and the 
anosognosia that render the two poles, usually adherent, 
distant. The study of the body through its disease 
provides a perspective antithetical to that of Descartes: 
Instead of discussing the body in general, life experience 
is investigated through an idiosyncratic but not exclusive 
mode of the body’s existence. Disease is a performing 
agent that casts light upon the spectrum of possible 
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explicitly refers to Kafka’s Metamorphosis through an analogy with 
the desensibilization of the body that approximates Gregor Samsa and 
the solitude that accompanies it. Note also Bachelard’s comments on 
Kafka in Lautréamont: “Kafka’s metamorphosis appears candidly as a 
strange retardation of life and actions. Shall I provide examples? [. . .] 
As the metamorphosis becomes more complete, Gregor is covered little 
by little with a sticky substance. He clings to the walls; he lives in a 
coagulated world, in a viscous temporality; he hobbles haltingly. He is 
dazed, always slow to grasp an idea, a feeling. With the least exertion 
he begins ‘to feel breathless.’ His whole life is an animality that wanes 
little by little” (Bachelard [note 21], p. 7). 
26. I. Svevo, Zeno’s Conscience, trans. W. Weaver (1923; New 
York, 2003), p. 105.
27. H. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. 
Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie, in Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. G. Dux, O. Marquard, and E. Ströker (1928; Frankfurt 
a.M., 1981), vol. IV, pp. 364–365.
28. The reference is to Lo Spinario, a Greco-Roman Hellenistic 
bronze sculpture of a boy withdrawing a thorn from the sole of his foot. 
There are many versions of the statue. The oldest is probably the one 
conserved at Palazzo dei Conservatori, Rome (I B.C.). It was removed to 
Paris from 1791 to 1815, where Kleist recalls having seen it.
Even though the fall, significantly, never happens, the 
original contradictions have grown rigid in conflict, and 
the conflict itself has been reduced to a separation that 
has become the very object of his reflection. The body 
thus becomes an unsettling and foreign contraption 
that does not need to deform itself to manifest an 
anarchic will. It is a monstruum. Helmuth Plessner 
coined the category of “eccentricity” [Exzentrizität ] to 
describe man’s ambivalent and synchronic experience 
of himself, inasmuch as he is an animal who both is 
and has a body. This category will allow us finally to 
rethink the passivity initially understood as a weakness 
and a flaw. “Man not only lives and experiences, but 
experiences his experience. [. . .] For him, his mutation 
from being within his own corporality to being outside 
of his corporality is an irrepressible deceitful aspect 
of existence, a real fracture in his nature.”27 He is 
not—trivially—impotent; rather he is dual-natured and 
therefore inhibited in his attempt to attain unity with 
himself. This is the fracture that the puppet—inasmuch 
as it is a performing object moved by an operator—
embodies and exhibits through its unique inorganic 
expressivity. While the skeleton and the mannequin 
represent degree zero of the experience that one has of 
him/herself, and in this sense they are indeed passive 
figures, the puppet puts into practice a medial and 
dynamic connection between the subject and the object 
that man represents to himself.
Kleist’s puppet
In The Puppet Theatre Heinrich von Kleist thematizes 
this paradox. He tells the story of a young man 
endowed with extraordinary grace and a great fluidity of 
movement. One day, after having seen a copy of a statue 
of a boy removing a thorn from his foot, he sees himself 
in an enormous mirror in a similar position.28 Suddenly 
aware of the resemblance, he attempts to reproduce 
the pose but he is never able to hold his body in quite 
the same way. He attempts to recover the grace he lost 
by practicing in front of a mirror, with only comical 
inertia, and not simply because it is the expression of a 
psycho-physical unity, nor because, to the contrary, it 
obstructs the intentions of its “proprietor.” Judt is able 
to describe his state because he avails himself of his 
senses as a means to introspection, and his suffering is 
not simply the dissociation of the self from the body, 
rather it is also indicative of the contradictions inherent 
in the body itself. Inasmuch as he is a living creature, he 
testifies to the tension—not the dualism or the schism—
between sensible experience and control of the body. It 
is a perspective antithetical to that through which Plato 
assimilated man and puppet. If disease makes possible 
an understanding rooted in the distance of man from 
himself, then conceiving of passivity as the fundamental 
disposition of humans is reductive and misleading: 
The point is that man cannot coincide with himself 
in his every “here and now.” Judt’s experience of his 
progressive alienation is, on the one hand, therefore the 
richest representation of man’s position in the world. It 
is, on the other hand, an experience of disappropriation 
that emerges precisely when we attempt to be faithful 
to ourselves, to fully take on our existence by exercising 
our faculty of reflection, which interrupts the immediacy 
of natural life. 
In a novel dedicated to the consciousness of its 
protagonist, which can be considered as an ideal 
conclusive stage in the process of the normalization 
of the body in Western culture, Italo Svevo’s Zeno is 
flabbergasted finding out that in a fraction of a second 
his leg when taking a single step activates fifty-four 
muscles and relates: “My thoughts immediately rushed 
to my legs, to seek this monstrous machinery. I believe I 
found it. Naturally I didn’t identify the fifty-four moving 
parts, but rather an enormous complication went to 
pieces the moment I intruded my attention upon it. I 
limped, leaving that café, and I went on limping for 
several days. [. . .] But even today, as I write about it, 
if someone watches me when I move, the fifty-four 
muscles become self-conscious and I risk falling.”26 
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grace admired in the animal world. It is as if a puppet 
that might be animated could reintroduce in the human 
world that mode of existence that the animal enjoys 
in nature: That is how I read Plessner when he affirms 
that man “does not possess the uninhibited precision 
of puppets, that is the instinctive self-confidence of an 
animal.”33 This is why a dancer who wants to improve 
could learn a great deal from a puppet master, Kleist 
remarks: “Every movement, he said, had a center 
of gravity; it sufficed if this, inside the figure, were 
controlled; the limbs, which were nothing but pendula, 
followed without interference, mechanically, of their 
own accord.”34 The dancer will govern the center of the 
figure drawing either a straight line or a curved line. The 
latter is elliptical—“a movement of that description was 
altogether natural to the extremities of the human body 
(because of the joints)”—and precisely this line “was 
nothing other than the way of the dancer’s soul.”35 In 
order to find it, the dancer has to move with the puppet, 
allowing his Leib to coincide with this artifact for just 
a moment. The Aristotelian perspective of involuntary 
kinetism is subverted and the ambiguity hidden in the 
idea of something like a puppet’s pure line of movement 
unveiled: “The good manipulator is not, as most people 
imagine, busily concerned with the details of which 
string to pull, which rod to push. He works the puppet as 
unconsciously as he works his own muscles: It becomes 
in fact an extension of himself.”36
The puppet’s body, whether made of wood or of cloth, 
is the setting of the expression of kinesthetic experience 
of oneself as a specific form of existential experience. 
The puppet, therefore, is paradoxically not implicated 
by the inertia of matter. It does not require a ground on 
which to rest and it delegates the difficulty and fatigue of 
thrusting vertically to the reliable strength of its operator. 
So much is this the medium of the unity of man with 
himself that Kleist’s dancer compares the relationship 
he has with it to that which some amputees have with 
their prosthetic limbs: “The range of their movements 
is limited, I grant you; but those they are capable of 
they execute with an ease, grace and poise that every 
thinking person must be astonished by.”37 The coherence 
results. This is the narcissistic version of the very “lack of 
elasticity” experienced by Zeno and also discussed by 
Bergson in Laughter.29 It refers to the damaging effects of 
reflection, which is to be understood in its double sense 
as speculative activity as well as the duplication of an 
image by means of gazing and mirroring. Certainly for 
Kleist it is not a matter of regretting irrational instinct. 
The text rather invites a renewed understanding of self-
consciousness. “We should have to eat again of the Tree 
of Knowledge to fall back into the state of innocence.”30 
The loss of innocence, from which the impossibility of 
being at peace with our animal nature depends, and 
thus the impossibility of the human body to perform a 
movement that is “natural” and not artificial or affected, 
is the leitmotiv of Kleist’s dialogue with a dancer in 
which he discusses how it is possible for the body to 
regain the fluidity of movement it once possessed—the 
pure line that Plato and Aristotle had attributed to the 
puppet—without availing itself the non-awareness of an 
animal. In fact, according to Kleist, a mere bear is the 
only living creature able to make all the right moves in 
reaction to the assaults of a fencer.31 The bear is superior 
to his opponent because he has preserved “the savage 
confidence of his animality”32 (to put it in the terms 
Plessner used in his comment on Kleist), which is in no 
way distinct from his awareness of being alive.
It is finally the puppet that allows the dancer—whose 
relationship to this artifact is analogous to that of the 
puppeteer—to reach the desired nimble agility. Man, as 
we have seen the embodiment of a shattered naturalness, 
is indeed able to recreate in the artificial world a 
medium through which to evoke the experience of the 
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body—which, in fact, consists of a human hand and 
of an artificial head worn on a finger. This contrast of 
the living and the inorganic renders it “astonishingly 
alive.”39 The hand puppet becomes a credible vehicle 
of expression as soon as it is set in motion, thanks to 
the metamorphosis of the natural function of the human 
fingers it has appropriated. In fact, the puppet represents 
not the mechanism of human movement but its e-motive 
essence. This does not occur due to a special gift of the 
puppeteer’s hand, which is agile through the medium 
of the puppet only to the extent that he feels his hand 
as extraneous and independent, as the puppet itself is, 
even though he is the one moving it.40 The trajectory 
here is the inverse of that of the dancer, but the result 
is the same. By becoming profoundly familiar with the 
disjunction between his “habit-body” and his “body 
at this moment,” the puppeteer is able to animate his 
puppet, which comes to life thanks to its ability to reveal 
such a disjunction. We can then understand, working 
backwards, why puppets and automatons are included in 
the same constellation. They represent different degrees 
of the self-comprehension of man as body.41 If the puppet 
is the embodiment of the “fracture,” the automaton 
reduces man to a self-propelled animal.
The dynamics of the conflict between being and 
having a body as well as the poietic force underlying 
these dynamics are recounted in Carlo Collodi’s The 
Adventures of Pinocchio. The recurring references to 
literary texts as “evidence” of the sentient experience 
of humankind should not be surprising. We are indeed 
discussing the inorganic counterfeit as an expression 
of our somatosensitive, animal side, which all of 
us have experienced, though none of us has either 
dominion over or factual knowledge of it. Let us recall 
the beginning of the novel: Geppetto takes a piece of 
wood, initially destined to become the leg of a table. 
The wood speaks, which startles him a great deal. He 
unflinchingly sets himself to carving the “marvelous 
puppet” that does not have to know how to think but 
“dance, fence with a sword and turn somersaults.” In 
of movement does not depend on the degree to which 
a factual body belongs to a living one—to whom it 
is at disposal—but on the coherence of sensible and 
kinesthetic potentiality and its actual expression, whether 
material, natural, or mixed with the artificial. With Kleist, 
we finally leave behind the domesticated reading of the 
puppet’s valence as the rhetorical figure of a man subject 
to powers that are alien to him.
The limits of the body
One could, nevertheless, object that the puppet as 
artifact is not much different from any other material 
enhancement of the human body. Even proposing—as I 
do—that the puppet is first and foremost potentiality of 
movement, yet this characteristic does not pertain to it 
exclusively, but also to any other piece of equipment—
as, for instance, to a pair of pliers or a flight of stairs. We 
can say then that the puppet is not merely neurospastos 
only if its relationship to the human body is as necessary 
for it to manifest its own nature as it is for man searching 
his own unity. Sergei Obraztsov, the puppeteer who has 
the merit of having made the puppet theater worthy of 
consideration as an artistic form, writes: “Strange as it 
may seem, its [the puppet’s] power lies in the very fact 
that it is inanimate. If an actor on a stage sits down in 
an armchair and hitches up his trouser legs so that his 
knees do not spoil the crease, the audience may well not 
notice it. But if the same movement is made by a puppet, 
the audience is likely to burst into applause because 
the puppet has made fun of all the men who make this 
movement.”38 The puppet needs man as its motor agent, 
but most of all it needs to be compared to man in order 
to gain from the contrast that is thus produced its own 
specific “artificial expressivity.” This expressivity does 
not simply and obviously depend on its anti-naturalistic 
aspect, but also on the physical competition by which 
this artificial object engages itself with its operator. 
Obraztsov, educated as an actor in the Stanislavskii 
method at the Moscow Art Theater, uses hand puppets, 
which have a relationship to the manipulator, inverse 
to that of the puppets that hang from strings cited by 
Kleist. In this case, it is not the artifact that acts as 
prosthesis to the puppeteer, it is the puppeteer who 
acts as the prosthesis of the artifact to whom he lends 
his fingers. Otherwise, the puppet would be missing its 
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circulated in Britain around 1720: It was said that in the 
first half of the fifth century A.D., Geiseric had invaded 
North Africa forcing the emperor Valentinian III into a 
peace agreement that divided it between the Vandals and 
the Romans. The Romans were orthodox Catholics and 
they were violently persecuted by Geiseric and his son 
Hunneric who adhered to the Arian heresy. According 
to the Anglican clergyman William Berriman, Hunneric 
had removed the tongues of some Mauritanian Catholics 
who continued to celebrate the consubstantiation of 
Christ with the Father, disregarding the Arian prohibition. 
They remained nevertheless capable of speaking in an 
articulate and distinct way.45 Hunneric’s goal was to 
demonstrate that the body is, metaphorically speaking, 
in and for itself as mute and impoverished as was 
the human body of Christ. The miracle would on the 
contrary testify to the body’s consubstantiality with the 
spirit, which is to say, its animating force. If we prescind 
from the theological question, in this pseudo-historical 
apologue the exceptionality of ventriloquism underlines 
the apparent independence of bodily expression from 
the laws of the body itself. Ventriloquism would show the 
healing of man’s inherently fractured self, conferring to 
him an intelligent body.
This phenomenon is nevertheless paradoxical, since 
the sound that the ventriloquist produces is acousmatic, 
which is to say that it does not reveal the source of its 
provenance. It is a disembodied sound that is somewhere 
between the material and the immaterial, between the 
corporeal and the purely sensible. Beginning in the late 
eighteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth 
century (not by chance, during the aforementioned 
quête period), a transition occurred from a notion of 
miraculous and divine ventriloquism to one of worldly 
and theatrical ventriloquism. In fact, the ventriloquist 
becomes “the allegorical figure for mechanized 
speech,”46 and he is given ever more attention just as 
androids are. He represents then a silent body that does 
not correspond to the activity of his organs, and precisely 
the exhibition of this independence allows him to be 
accompanied by a dummy, in a game of substitutions. 
Nevertheless, the reciprocal independence of the voice 
and of its corporeal agent demonstrates by contrast the 
aesthetic force of their bond. 
short, it must be extremely agile. As Pinocchio’s organs 
slowly take form, they spring into action: His eyes move, 
his nose grows, his mouth laughs and his hands snatch 
Geppetto’s blond wig which Pinocchio promptly puts 
on his own head. The wig is a metonymic indication of 
the relationship between the puppet and his artificer, 
antithetical to that of the statue to its sculptor (as was the 
case with Pygmalion). Tzachi Zamir is correct when he 
writes: “To wear a wig is to pass oneself off as someone 
else. By snatching it, the marionette exposes Geppetto’s 
own theatricality, his own constitution out of detachable 
parts. [. . .] Taking control of the wig is the culmination 
of the process in which mock animation meets the real 
thing and in which Pinocchio is animated as Geppetto 
is deanimated. By pinching the wig and putting it on 
its own head, the would-be puppet unmakes its human 
creator, overturning the relations of creation between 
things and agents.”42 The wig, an incorporated ornament 
placed on the most external limit of the body, represents 
the threshold over which Geppetto and Pinocchio 
compete for their respective identity and humanity. 
Proclaimed father and son by the author, they seem to 
be born thanks to that generatio aequivoca that Bruno 
Schulz discusses in his Treatise on Tailor’s Dummies 
by interrogating the imitative tendencies of matter: 
Where does my body end? What makes me uniquely 
me? The body is the field of battle for the conflict 
between inorganic insensitivity and physiognomy of the 
passions.43
An aesthetic marvel
If the body of the puppet with its complete lack of 
autonomy emphasizes kinesthesia as the condition 
necessary for living beings to consciously come into full 
possession of themselves, its muteness, compensated for 
by the puppeteer, points to the voice as a condition of 
the human body’s immanence to itself.44 Nevertheless, 
while movement pertains to man’s animal nature, 
discourse pertains to him inasmuch as he is a rational 
being, and the voice, which is the transmitter of 
discourse, would seem to attest to the conjunction 
between body and spirit, not to their distance. An 
emblem of this conjunction is found in a story that 
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derives the uncanny feeling it solicits. According to 
Ernst Jentsch, who describes this special restlessness 
in On the Psychology of the Uncanny, man tends to 
deduce the animating force imbuing worldly things from 
their apparent animation, by a process of ingenuous 
analogical thought that is indifferent to the causal 
order of events and relationships. When this occurs, 
a special form of marvel and of disorientation arises. 
Next to the wonder abated by the actualization of such 
an enigmatic yet somehow functional occurrence, “a 
slight nuance of the uncanny effect does also come to 
light now and then in the case of real admiration, and 
can be explained psychologically in terms of one’s 
bafflement regarding how the conditions of origin for 
the achievement in question were brought about, on 
account of which such a nuance is generally lacking 
in those who are special experts in the field at stake.”52 
The attribution of this sentiment to intellectually naïve 
mental processes finally justifies the fact that the puppet 
has been considered a toy for children and simpletons, 
and the reference to a system of analogical thought 
confirms its metaphorical valence and its capacity to 
induce in man paths of self-awareness. The psychological 
explanation of the Unheimlich would justify then that it 
can be solicited indifferently by all artifacts that resemble 
puppets—although Jentsch does not mention these, 
referring instead just to dolls and automatons –-so that 
it would therefore be unnecessary to evoke an aesthetic 
specificity that inheres exclusively to any one of these 
artifacts. 
Nevertheless, if the Unheimlich results whenever 
there is any “doubt as to whether an apparently living 
being really is animate and, conversely, doubt as to 
whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate—
and more precisely, when this doubt only makes itself 
felt obscurely in one’s consciousness,”53 then that which 
disturbs must have an aesthetic foundation before ever 
having a psychological one. And indeed, movement 
and sound are the occasions that induce it, as Jentsch 
implicitly recognizes, mentioning the movement of 
the automaton and the sound of boiling water into 
which Robinson Crusoe’s Friday ignorantly plunges 
his hand to catch what “evidently” lies therein. This 
evidence depends on the phenomenological tie between 
movement and life and between voice and body, and 
motivates, finally, in an aesthetic sense the thauma that 
only the puppet can solicit in a rigorous sense—also 
This paradox was staged by Samuel Beckett in Not I.  
The dramaturge, who cites Kleist as reference in his 
directorial instructions, had the actress Billie Whitelaw 
sit in a chair suspended three meters off the ground 
and completely covered her body with a black sheet 
that left only her mouth exposed. Her head was then 
held immobile by two pieces of rubber, in order to 
ensure that she did not move. “I think I had sensory 
deprivation,” Whitelaw remembers. “I felt I had no 
body.”47 Yet, “phenomenologically, the fact that an 
unassigned voice must always imply a body means that 
it will always partly supply it as well.”48 Therefore—as 
the loquacious and nimble-fingered Pinocchio already 
suggested—the voice is, after movement, the second 
agency of the puppet,49 capable not only and not so 
much of making present that which is absent, but of 
enlivening the present.50 As much as the puppeteer 
must then explore in depth the dissociation between the 
experience of himself as living body and the awareness 
of being an alien in order to lend movement to the 
puppet, so he must also suggest the dissociation peculiar 
to the ventriloquist between his body and its sonorous 
expression, lending the puppet a voice. The puppeteer 
acts as the acousmêtre of the puppet, according to the 
expression with which Michel Chion defines those who 
are “neither inside nor outside the image. It is not inside, 
because the image of the voice’s source—the body, the 
mouth—is not included. Nor is it outside, since it is not 
clearly positioned off-screen in an imaginary ‘wing,’ like 
a master of ceremonies or a witness, and it is implicated 
in the action, constantly about to be part of it.”51 
From this tension between the living and non-living, 
this oxymoron of inorganic expressivity, the puppet 
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apart from the rules of fiction that govern the theatrical 
game in which it is a player.
In an attempt to delineate a preliminary 
phenomenology of the puppet, I have endeavored 
to demonstrate that it must not be taken merely as a 
metaphor for the passivity of man but rather as the 
direct inorganic expression of his conflicting existential 
condition. Its explicit artificiality, animated by rhythmic 
movements and sound, human though not naturalistic, 
endows it with an unnatural sensitivity, a hetero-directed 
responsiveness from which it derives the aesthetic quality 
of a stage-presence that is much more fitting than that of 
an actor, because as Wilhelm Worringer said, its abstract 
mechanical activity is vastly superior “in strength of 
expression to organic activity, which is always connected 
with organic harmony, and therefore rather serves 
beauty than power of expression.”54 Such an outdated 
toy therefore makes apparent the original dynamics 
through which the living and the artificial collaborate 
in the human body and in man’s experience of himself, 
including his impossible attempts at achieving unity. The 
puppet well deserves, finally, the ancient honor of being 
considered a marvel. 
Translated from the Italian by Steve Baker
